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Introduction
Writers of fiction looking to the past have imagined our ancestors as hairy cave
wo/men: strong in body but of little wit. Others, looking ahead, have projected
a race strong in mind but virtually disembodied: big brains on push-button
fingers. Such is rationality’s prestige that the latter vision beats the former,
hands down. Who covets the healthy outdoor life of our nearest relatives, the
care-free chimpanzees mindless of tomorrow? How much better the angst of
cultural evolution-by-technology whereby brains are enlarged and enhanced via
the computer’s microchips, while bodies pale and soften in the glow of the
cathode tube!
Choice between chimps or chips, between body or mind, is no option. We
humans are body/mind, a necessary melding of the material and immaterial.
Yet often we speak as if one is detachable from the other, with the implication
that the more valuable mind can be disconnected from the less valuable body.
Hope for such a separation springs eternal in the human breast, particularly
when the ego confronts death. But, at least in this existence, the aspiration to
divorce mind from body is perilous insofar as it depreciates the source of health:
the body and, by extension, the world that generated body/mind and sustains
it for a lifetime.
My thesis is that the theorists of both Modernism and Postmodernism sacrifice
body to mind, the real to the ideal. They put their faith in artifacts and
abstractions of intellect while devaluing their source and support: planet Earth.
The mechanical supplants the organic. Thus, Virtual Reality - faking Nature
symbolically ”on-line” - puts the future of Nature on the line.
Mind versus Body
A philosophic tradition with roots beyond Plato supports the notion that ideas
- the tissues of mind - are the ultimate realities, compared to which phenomenal
bodies are but shadows. ”You must forgive me, dear friend,” said Socrates to
Phaedrus, ”I’m a lover of learning, and trees and open country (read ”the world
of nature”) won’t teach me anything.”
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The implications of this Platonic theme for the culture of a terminal high-
tech society were essayed in 1928 by E.M.Forster. In ”The Machine Stops,”
people are housed or ”hived” in air-conditioned comfort below the surface of an
Earth that has mostly been devastated. Anticipating the TV screen and the
Internet, Forster described the coming age of Virtual Reality where everyone
converses electronically, never face to face, mostly about ideas. Vashti, a music
specialist, observes that visiting Earth’s surface is vulgar and faintly improper
for spiritually minded people; it is contrary to the spirit of the age, because air
and stars and mountains ”give no ideas.” A popular slogan is ”Beware of first-
hand ideas!” Those who want to know what Earth is like can listen to lectures
on it, compiled from lectures formerly given on the basis of even earlier lectures.
Vashti’s rebellious son, Kuno, discovers his long-disused muscles and infers that
his body is the measure for all that is lovable, desirable and strong. He climbs
a shaft to the earth’s surface but is soon discovered and dragged back below.
He says to Vashti:
Cannot you see that we are dying and the only thing that really
lives down here is the Machine? It has robbed us of the sense of
space and of the sense of touch, it has blurred every human relation
and narrowed down love to a carnal act, it has paralyzed our bodies
and our wills, and it compels us to worship it. We exist only as the
blood corpuscles that course through its arteries ... I have only one
remedy, to tell men again and again that I have seen the hills of
Wessex ... the dear ferns and the living hills.
Seventy years after it was written, the story has a prophetic ring. An anti-
naturalistic preoccupation with ideas and ideals, fed by a technology of sym-
bols, lies at the root of the West’s denigration of body as compared to mind,
along with its negligent treatment of Earth. Perhaps a chief function of to-
day’s ecofeminism is to remind all genders that bodies exist as expressions of
natural rhythms - living, breathing, reproducing, dying - tuned to Sun, Moon
and Earth, rather than to masculine philosophies. Perhaps the function of art
and aesthetics is to teach again the importance of the sensory component of
perception, ”to bring us to our senses,” exposing idealism’s bloodless logic that
dismisses as secondary the intuited, richly sensuous, organic world.
The World of Spontaneous Experience
David Hume, the Scot sceptic, demolished both mind and matter. All we know
of either, he said, are insubstantial ”impressions.” Most of us ignore the sceptic’s
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logic and accept as fact that we live our daily lives in a world of material
things, even though, in Hume’s words, ”this universal and primary concern of
all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy.” Rationality may suggest
that a chair is nothing but an impression, a mind-image, or a constellation of
sub-atomic particles whirling in mostly empty space, but still we perceive a
chair as a back attached to a seat and use it as a four-legged support when
sitting down to an apparently material dinner. Hume was fully aware of this
disparity between philosophic ”reality” and the reality that Naess (1993/94)
has called ”spontaneous experience.” It seems evident, wrote Hume, that ”men
are carried, by a natural instinct or pre-possession, to repose faith in their
senses: and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason,
we always suppose an external universe” (Hume cited in Hargrove 1989). In
short, the ”natural instinct” that supports belief in a physical existence, with
its spontaneous experience of valued material objects, is a body-wisdom that
makes more sense than the philosopher’s logic.
How strange that arguments have to be made for the tangibility of an expe-
rienced world of water and clouds, forests and flowers, humus and humans,
while the ”real” is attributed to intangibles: eternal forms, spirits, souls, sym-
bols, words, language. Some today believe that ”discourse” (literally, mental
running to and fro) makes reality: an academic concept that floats on a body
of science/technology whose material artifacts and manipulations provide the
substantial matrix of urban living. Hargrove (1989) has added two additional
thoughts in support of the experienced common-sense world. Ordinary language
is based most fundamentally on belief in physical objects, reference to which is
largely what holds a language together and provides the basis of translation
between languages. Further, aesthetics as a field of philosophy began with dis-
cussion of the qualities of natural objects, their beauty and sublimity. It would
be a poor aesthetics that excluded the World of Nature and dealt only with the
elegance of theories, the beauty of ideas and the charm of texts.
Scepticism about the existence of a natural world of inherent value, in which
we are enveloped, seems less a sophisticated than a head-in-the-sand stance.
But technology, ideology, and a preoccupation with our own species blind us to
ecological perceptions.
Technology/Philosophy and Humanism
The technologies that people adopt influence their philosophic views. A classic
example is invention of clockwork machines in the early Middle Ages, soon
followed by the invention of a clockwork universe - which has served science
well but Earth poorly. Ferguson (1966) championed the thesis that concept
follows conduct: in adopting any appealing technology, men act and then they
think. Ideas and sentiments arise out of repetitive physical acts. Men sailed
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before they made a cult of the sea; they killed with guns before they made a
cult of the gun. Both cults are perpetuated in manly ego-boosting rituals played
out again and again in sagas of the sea and in Western movies (where women are
inconspicuous and never interfere). The gun makes the Western myth; hence it
would be ridiculous to negotiate a peaceful ending rather than shooting it out!
Further to this line of thought, Ferguson optimistically suggested that technolo-
gies having to do with non-combative interactions such as trade and commerce,
with exchanges of information and communication between individuals and na-
tions, should result in a cult of cooperation. Will free trade make for peace?
Let us all hope.
An even more benign effect is sometimes postulated. The very way a technology
is assembled, let alone the way it is used, may change society for the better. The
present generation of children growing up with computers will think ecologically
because the computer is the technologic analogue of an ecosystem! Somehow,
the dramatic changes effected in the whole configuration of a spreadsheet by one
keystroke on the PC will impress on youngsters the fact that the extirpation of
a single keystone species can precipitate cascading reverberations throughout
a biotic community. Thus new technologies will inspire in society the same
integrated ”system-ideas” they embody. Dream on!
Less optimistic than the techno-philosophers are teachers reporting a ”dumbing
down” of children brought up by TV in loco parentis. Without daily experience
of the lively interplay of language between real people, a child’s foundation for
intellectual development is weakened. Some suspect that technologies may even
change bodies at the cellular level, ”rearranging the brain’s neurons to suit a
TV-driven seven-second attention span, say, or an escalating desire for cine-
matic explosions” (Kroker 1996a). This is a version of the yet-to-be-discredited
proposition that given sufficient exposure, TV can turn brains into porridge.
Doubtless technologies mould attitudes, the medium generating its inherent
message as Marshall McLuhan foresaw and as Kirkpatrick Sale (1995) and Jerry
Mander (1991) forcefully argue today. Automobiles will not conduce to compact
cities nor will weapons encourage peaceful thoughts. Machines made to serve
efficiency will not foster a high valuation of leisure in the workers they displace.
The Net will not inspire close flesh-and-blood communities.
But attitudes also affect technology and the two co-evolve, the configuration
at any given time expressing deep historical-cultural forces. One major change-
generating dynamic is the ancient belief-system combining faith in progress with
faith that the human species is God’s special pet. This guiding paradigm cre-
ates the climate in which rationality discovers its human-centered goals, dresses
them in supportive ideas and sentiments, and pursues them with an evolving
science/technology.
The deep dynamic that today drives the twinned technology-attitudes has been
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called ”Speciesism” or ”Humanism,” defined as the ideological fixation on Homo
sapiens to the exclusion of all else. This definition of humanism is meant to be
pejorative, used in the sense of ”selfishly homocentric” rather than in the more
flattering senses of dictionary definitions. The claims of the latter have their
place, but the importance and exclusivity attached to them, even by such a
humane thinker as John Ralston Saul (1995), reveal the purblind perspective
from which humanity has viewed the universe, especially in the last three or
four centuries of modernistic thought.
Criticizing narrow humanism, Claude Levi-Strauss championed the humility of
tribal people for whom ”a well-ordered harmony does not begin with the self, but
rather places the world before life, life before man, the respect for other beings
before the love of self.” (Emphasis added to Levi-Strauss’s order of importance:
world, life, man, other beings, self). This, he insisted, is not misanthropy but
rather a critique of the strutting and shameless arrogance that makes man the
lord and master of creation. The rights that one can and should recognize for
mankind are only a special case of those rights that must be granted to the
creative force of life. Care about mankind without simultaneous solidarity-like
caring for all other forms of life, he said, leads mankind to self-oppression and
self-exploitation (cited by Zimmerman 1994).
Those firmly wedded to the status quo frequently express fear, genuine or
feigned, that placing high value on Nature will necessarily devalue people, lead-
ing straight to fascism. Levi-Strauss’s argument is the direct opposite. A sole
obsession with humanity is the road to disaster. Grounding ethics within the
segregated ghetto of Humanism will not protect against such evils as racism and
fascism. No matter what virtues humanity ascribes to itself, some group will as-
sert its superiority by claiming to possess more of ”the goods” than others. The
anchor-point for a ”principled humility” must be found in a greater-than-human
reality, one that transcends every culture and every ingrown morality.
Along the same lines, Berman (1984) agreed with Wilhelm Reich that industrial
democracy is dry tinder for fascism and the irrational, precisely because - as
disembodied consciousness at war with nature - it is so sterile, so ”out of this
world,” so rootless. Rootedness must spring from ecological awareness of what it
means to live-in-place, ”where nature is the model for culture because the mind
has been nourished and weaned on nature.” ”It is my guess,” said Berman, ”that
preservation of this planet may be the best guideline for all our politics ... The
health of the planet, if it can be successfully defended against the continuing
momentum of industrial socialism and capitalism, may thus be the ultimate
safety valve in the emergence of a new consciousness.” Here is the call for a
post-humanist faith that corrects an ancient error, acknowledging the supra-
human value of the Earthly context formerly ignored or slighted (Gray 1995).
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An Ecological Perspective: Post-Humanism
The criteria of a ”good” theory are its explanatory power, its capacity to inte-
grate disparate observations, and its heuristic abilities that open new perspec-
tives. These are the characteristics that, for example, confer superiority on the
theory of evolution over the theory of creation. By the same criteria, the best
myth-theory of our time tells the story of Earth’s star-dust beginning and sub-
sequent elaboration mirrored in its interactive parts: improbable atmosphere,
sea water, continents, soils and sediments, all evolving along with a spectacular
complex of organic forms including Homo sapiens: one of today’s 30 million
vivacious species.
Scientists use the terms ”life” and ”organism” as if they are one and the same,
reflecting the reductionist idea that the source of the energizing life-spark of
things-like-us is strictly internal. The question, ”When did life begin?” is as-
sumed to be the same as, ”When did identifiable organisms appear?” But from
an ecological viewpoint - i.e. granting importance to context - the question
becomes, ”At what stage in the history of Earth’s increasing complexity did it
engender identifiable organisms?” This throws the spotlight on planet Earth as
the central marvel, the source and support of ”life” - whatever that mystery
may be. Bereft of Earth’s permanent vitality, organisms lose their transient
vitality. Neglect of Earth’s health is a threat to all its constituents, organic and
inorganic, now and in the future.
Note that the ecological perspective magnifies the value of what has traditionally
been portrayed as a mostly dead environment. Liveliness exists in all things:
in air, water, soil, as well as in organisms. All parts of the living Earth or
Ecosphere are important, the inorganic equally with the organic. Earth itself
is not an organism in the biologist’s sense, nor is it a super-organism. The
Ecosphere is supra-organismic: a higher level of organization than the inorganic
and organic parts it comprises. Here is the logical basis for a drastic move in
philosophic position from homocentrism and biocentrism to ecocentrism.
The foregoing text is an expression of Post-Humanism, akin to Deep Ecological
Philosophy or Deep Ecology. It is radically ecological, favoring a broadened
focus that includes humanity’s enveloping matrix. It acknowledges, with a cel-
ebratory sense of awe and wonder, the source of creativity in undomesticated
Earth. Although it affirms that the protection of Earth-life requires a global
scaling down of the human enterprise, it is not anti-human. It recognizes the
importance, within the human community, of an ”emancipatory agenda” that
furthers and supports democracy, equity, justice, and freedom of the individual
from oppression. It believes, however, that these values cannot be fully achieved
nor long preserved in an inturned, homocentric culture.
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Modernism, Postmodernism and Virtual Reality
The enthronement of reason is the chief achievement of post-Enlightenment
”Modernism” in its rebellion against centuries of religious dogma and uncriti-
cal acceptance of authority. Science is acclaimed as Modernism’s finest fruit,
carrying in its train ideas of perpetual progress: greater and greater materi-
al well-being through economic growth fuelled by technology. Congruent with
science’s search for unifying theories has been Modernism’s ”discourse of uni-
versals,” meaning belief in over-arching social truths, belief in all-encompassing
ideologies, in single ”best” political systems, in understanding human groups
(e.g. the class, ”women”) by reference to biological or social ”essences” (Ross
1988). Modernity’s ”emancipatory agenda” of democracy and human rights is
an important ”universal” rooted in Greek thought and in the Judaeo-Christian
theme of the importance of the individual before God, energized most recent-
ly by the American and French Revolutions that promoted the political and
economic importance of the individual’s freedom.
Postmodern theory arose as a challenge to Modernism’s theses - excepting only
the axiomatic thesis of homocentrism. Disillusioned with the claims to hege-
mony of both capitalism and Marxist socialism, it rejects the ”discourse of
universals.” It also rejects belief in essentialist categories, the search for ”to-
talizing” grand theories, the demonology of single causes (corporations are to
blame, technology is to blame, people on welfare are to blame). It subscribes
to some parts of Modernity’s ”emancipatory agenda,” aiming to promote social
justice among all social and cultural groups (Zimmerman 1994).
Much of the reaction against Modernism’s ”truths” is defensible and praisewor-
thy, but the French deconstructionists carried their rebellion much further. For
them, symbols and language are the framers and carriers of reality. All explana-
tory narratives, all texts, are power-motivated and must be so interpreted. A
statement such as ”Scientists claim that over-population is a cause of deterio-
ration in Earth’s environment” is interpreted as a ploy by white middle-class
men to elevate their prestige, while guilting the world’s poor. No language of
disinterest exists. All categories are cultural constructs and ”truth,” for exam-
ple, cannot be objective; in the final analysis it can only reflect multicultural
consensus.
Postmodernism’s radical, subjective relativism marks the contemporary rebirth
of idealism as linguistic idealism. In a world of signs and symbols, the physical -
the material, the body, the Earth - is devalued and pushed into the background
(Sessions 1995a). If, as earlier suggested, technologies invent or ”find” their ap-
propriate philosophies under the guiding hand of Humanism, then homocentric
postmodernism was surely conjured into being by Virtual Reality. Both replace
an objective world with subjective tokens and facsimiles. Reality is up for grabs.
When faith that Nature can be discovered is replaced by faith that Nature is
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socially constructed, as many ”Natures” exist as ethnic groups and languages.
Nature (Earth, Ecosphere) becomes just another ”off-line” fabrication, a cultur-
al projection that can be reinvented ”on-line” in any way people want. Many
academics explicitly accept this dangerous idea (for example, Berleant 1992 and
Schama 1995) which makes the West Edmonton Mall as ”wild” as Jasper Nation-
al Park, Disneyland as charming as the Florida Everglades, and the dream-world
of Virtual Reality better, cleaner and easier to access than any Earthly reality -
given only that the choices between better and worse reflect multicultural con-
sensus. Further, the evolutionary biological-ecological basis of a specific human
nature disappears into thin air. Human nature is whatever people want to make
it by hooking themselves into the appropriate technology.
Kroker (1992) suggested that contemporary people are ”possessed” by Virtual
Reality, dominated by the technotopian dream and its assumed inevitability
(”You can’t stop progress, so upgrade or die”), ruled more and more by the
”Will to Virtuality”. Their wish, he said, is to upload themselves into the great
Net in the sky, to shed the weak fleshly bodies for the hard perfection of wiring
and machinery. Dreaming of disembodied existence they want to become pure
data. In the same vein, another ”McLuhanite” foresees the wiring of human and
artificial minds into one planetary soul, the realization of Teilhard de Chardin’s
noosphere - ”sufficiently interesting to provide company for God.” According
to Barlow (1996): ”When the yearning for human flesh has come to an end,
what will remain? Mind may continue, uploaded into the Net, suspended in an
ecology of voltage as ambitiously capable of self-sustenance as was that of its
carbon-based forebears.” Thus the ultimate promise of the Internet is immortal
mind, released from corpo-reality. Perhaps this is the last and most appealing
option for a thoroughly postmodern, industrialized, technologized and urbanized
species.
The Human Predicament is Fundamentally Eco-
logical
In Forster’s tale an electronic technology, separating person from person and
isolating society from external world, promoted the elevation of mind and ideas
over body and earth. All facets of existence were wrapped in artifacts. Each
individual was incarcerated in the prison house of technology, living in soli-
tary electronic confinement. People communicated by a kind of Internet; they
shrank from ecological contact with other persons, with other organisms, with
Earth itself. Virtual Reality replaced the biological-ecological realities of seas
and continents, sun-warmed air, clean water, fertile soils, mountains and green
forests. The fount of creativity and beauty, of physical and mental health, had
been completely rejected in favor of a comfort-machine whose only food for the
human mind consisted of human artifacts, images and ideas - a fair description
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of inner-city living today?
Ahead of his time, Forster identified the fundamental human problem as ecolog-
ical rather than sociological. His solution: Be prepared to lay aside the techno-
logic garments that stand between the bonding of mind to vigorous body, and
the bonding of body to life-giving planet. The first priority is establishment of a
healthy relationship between mind, body and Earth, which are one. In a context
of ecological well-being (and here we should add, ”within ecoregions”) the way
is prepared for solution of psychological and social problems. By accenting the
importance of Earth-as-context, Forster implied that full human developmen-
t necessitates connections with our organic evolutionary roots in Earth. Any
technology that interferes, injuring body and mind, must be resisted. He speaks
to us today as an ecologist, a Neo-Luddite, a Post-Humanist.
Forster’s contemporary dystopians (Zamiatin 1921, Huxley 1932, Orwell 1949)
placed little importance on the Earth-body/mind relationship. Although Za-
miatin came the closest, the three did not identify the fundamental human
problem as ecological but as sociological: i.e. as oppression by a fascist elite
leading to loss of liberty, the control of the individual by ”soft” technologies and,
in the extreme, control by brute force. Their rallying cry was: ”Citizens, don’t
trade your individual liberty for bread and circuses!” In this they expressed the
freedom-seeking goals of Modernism, as do the many contemporary varieties of
”social ecologists” who claim to be radically ecological though their agendas be-
tray them. They are not post-humanist, not ecocentric (Sessions 1995b). Their
primary goal - estimable to be sure but too narrowly conceived - is social justice
for one disadvantaged group or another. They co-opt ecological arguments as
clubs to belabor the opposition, but their philosophy is thoroughly homocentric.
Postmodernism stands ready to carry Humanism to its ultimate limit. By re-
jecting the reality of a Nature inside and outside the human, by rejecting the
evolved biological-ecological organic Earth, postmodern theorists assert that an
objective world possessing intrinsic value is meaningless. For them, human na-
ture defines itself. The human body is a failed project. Thenceforth ”evolution”
will mean a closer and closer linking of mind to machine, marrying the carbon-
based brain to the silicon-based computer. The trend is clear and in the spirit
of ”Join ’em if you can’t lick ’em,” women are called to be Cyborgs, postmodern
creatures melding animal, human and mechanical components (Haraway 1991).
Symbol of the 21st Century: the pregnant robot.
Faith that the universe is person-centered, faith that personal comfort and con-
venience are the aims of existence, will continue to call up a spectrum of solacing
technological garments, prosthetic cocoons of which the most extreme obviate
the need for an external world by projecting artifacts of it ”on-line.” An ersatz
universe effaces all notions of its own unreality. Once embedded in it, surround-
ed by it, any thoughts of escape evaporate. By blanking out every intimation
of deprival, Virtual Reality places the fate of body and Nature squarely on the
line.
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As the remaining fragments of the human ”wild-within” and of nature’s ”wild-
without” are invaded, caged or whittled away, postmodern’s Virtual Reality
moves in to take their places. Forster’s closing lines from ”The Machine Stops,”
phrased in the gender un-neutral language of his day, sound a vivid warning:
Ere silence was completed their hearts were opened and they knew
what had been important on earth. Man, the flower of all flesh, the
noblest of all creatures visible, who had once made god in his image,
was dying, strangled in the garments that he had woven. Truly
the garment had seemed heavenly at first, shot with the colours of
culture, sewn with the threads of self-denial. And heavenly it had
been so long as it was a garment and no more, so long as man could
shed it at will and live by the essence that is his soul and the essence,
equally divine, that is his body. The sin against the body - it was for
that they wept in chief; the centuries of wrong against the muscles
and nerves, and those five portals by which we can alone apprehend
- glossing it over with talk of evolution, until the body was white
pap, the home of ideas as colorless, last sloshy stirrings of a spirit
that had grasped the stars.
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